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1.1    Introduction
Belgium is characterized by a very low labor force participation rate at 
older ages. According to Eurostat, in 2001, Belgium was in the leading group 
of European countries with respect to early retirement. On average, workers 
dropped out of the labor force at an average age of 57.9 years. Since then, 
the long-  standing trend toward lower retirement ages tapered oﬀ. By 2005, 
the number increased to 59.6 years of age—and thus remains at a rather 
low level by international standards. Another indicator is the employment 
rate among the elderly workers, which is also far from satisfying the Lisbon 
criteria in terms of labor force activity rates of the elderly—and this in spite 
of the fact that more than half the time imparted by the EU has passed by 
without much action.1
Following the studies of Blondal and Scarpetta (1999) and Gruber and 
Wise (1999, 2003), there is a widespread recognition by academics and 
policymakers alike that the generosity of the social security and retirement 
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1. The Lisbon strategy was adopted for a ten-  year period in 2000. It broadly aims to “make 
Europe, by 2010, the most competitive and the most dynamic knowledge economy in the 
world.” One of the goals is to achieve a 50 percent employment rate of the elderly population 
(people age ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four). In Belgium, the elderly employment rate was 25 percent in 
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2. As an example, see the headline of a Belgian biweekly union newsletter: “More early retire-
ment also means more jobs for young people!” (Syndicats, August 29, 2005).
systems has had a potentially decisive role in shaping the retirement patterns. 
Beyond the sheer generosity of the systems in terms of their beneﬁ  t levels, 
it is by now recognized that marginal incentives toward exiting work play 
a decisive role in individual and collective decision making. By imposing 
explicit or implicit taxes on continued work, the systems favor early retire-
ment and thus early exit from the labor force.
While reasons for such incentives toward early retirement can be multiple, 
one prominent justiﬁ  cation often encountered is that giving older workers 
an incentive to leave the labor market frees up space for younger workers.2 
This chapter addresses this issue from several perspectives within the Belgian 
context. Our aim is to derive a conclusive answer on the often cited potential 
for substitutability of employment of the old with that of the younger age 
groups.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 1.2 we give some insti-
tutional background on the systems and regimes applicable to the older 
workers, as well as some speciﬁ  city applicable to the young. Section 1.3 
gives some theoretical arguments regarding both early retirement and youth 
unemployment. Section 1.4 proceeds on to a description of the data. Section 
1.5 estimates the eﬀect of incentive variables on activity rates, and docu-
ments the overall weak impact of parameters regarding the old on behavior 
of the young. Section 1.6 contains an alternative and more comprehensive 
speciﬁ  cation for the existing diﬀerence between sex groups and section 1.7 
concludes.
1.2    Institutional  Background
The aim of this section is to describe the most important social protection 
schemes that provide for some form of replacement income when retiring 
from the labor market and when young and inactive. This chapter focuses 
on the wage earners. For the treatment of the young, this does not repre-
sent a signiﬁ  cant limitation, as unemployment beneﬁ  ts are not accessible 
to the public sector anyway. For retirement, it thus exclusively models the 
wage earner pension and early retirement systems and does not consider 
the regimes applicable to either civil servants or the self-  employed. The rea-
son for this selective treatment lies in the severe data limitations, which do 
not allow us to identify which system a person belongs to (see section 1.4). 
Therefore, this chapter opts for a selective but detailed modeling strategy 
focusing on the single most important regime covering a wide majority of 
Belgian workers—while emphasizing the multitude of options available to 
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1.2.1      The Policy Framework Regarding the 
Withdrawal from the Labor Force
Anticipated Retirement under the Private Sector Wage-  Earner Scheme
The public pension system is ﬁ  nanced by tax-  deductible employer and 
employee contributions and by contributions from the federal government’s 
budget on a pay- as- you- go (PAYG) basis. Social security beneﬁ  ts are indexed 
to the cost of living and from time to time adjusted on a purely discretionary 
basis to the growth rate of the economy.
A pivotal year in the pension systems of the private sector wage earners is 
the year 1967. As a result of the merger of several existing pension schemes 
for diﬀerent categories of workers the pension system takes on its current 
form. The basic attributes of the scheme are its PAYG ﬁ  nancing mechanism, 
and the determination of a normal age of retirement set at sixty- ﬁ  ve for men 
and at sixty for women. Anticipated retirement is allowed up to ﬁ  ve years 
before the normal retirement age. Early retirement is accompanied by an 
actuarial reduction of 5 percent of the beneﬁ  ts by year of anticipation to 
compensate for the longer period of beneﬁ  t claiming and the shorter period 
of contributions. The pension beneﬁ  t is calculated on the basis of a forty-
 ﬁ  v e -  y e a r   c a r e e r   f o r   m e n   a n d   f o r t y -  y e a r   c a r e e r   f o r   w o m e n .   I n   t h i s   f r a m e -
work, retirement at the age of sixty-  four, without reduction of the beneﬁ  ts, 
is allowed for men who have already forty-  ﬁ  ve years of career or who have 
been employed in severe work conditions. A special treatment is applicable to 
veterans, resistance ﬁ  ghters, and deported people who beneﬁ  ted from a na-
tional recognition. As of 1969, they can anticipate the date of retirement by 
a maximum of ﬁ  ve years without any reduction of beneﬁ  ts. Special regimes 
also remain in place for some speciﬁ  c sectors, such as most notably for coal 
mining and the maritime sector.
In 1977, a ﬁ  rst step is taken to allow for early retirement within the afore-
mentioned general pension system. The special early retirement schemes 
(“Régimes de prépension spéciale”) give disabled workers or long-  term 
unemployed at least sixty years of age for men and of ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve for women 
a bonus equal to the diﬀerence between the actual pension and the one they 
would receive if it was not reduced by the “5 percent rule.” This speciﬁ  c 
early retirement system is rather short-  lived and is only applicable for a few 
years. It is formally terminated in 1979 for disabled workers and in 1982 for 
unemployed.
In 1983, a new scheme of early retirement is introduced within the frame-
work of the pension system. The program of “Prépension de retraite” allows 
for male workers retiring with a maximum of ﬁ  ve years of anticipation 
without reduction of the beneﬁ  ts if the employer commits to replacing the 
worker by an unemployed who is beneﬁ  ting from a full-  time compensation 
from the unemployment insurance. This second early retirement scheme 50        Alain Jousten, Mathieu Lefèbvre, Sergio Perelman, and Pierre Pestieau
3. The Belgian Intergenerational Solidarity Pact includes some thirty measures aimed at 
reducing early retirement without changing the legal retirement age or current beneﬁ  ts already 
granted. Measures include limiting the number of people taking early retirement, stimulating 
employers to retain or hire older workers as well as making early retirement less attractive for 
both workers and employers.
will only end in 1991 with the introduction of the concept of a ﬂ  exible 
retirement age in the pension system. Since 1987 (for women) and 1991 (for 
men), workers can freely choose the age of retirement without reduction 
of beneﬁ  ts as soon as age sixty, while maintaining separate normal retire-
ment ages and full-  career requirements for the two sexes. This means that 
the system has become signiﬁ  cantly more ﬂ  exible and generous as both the 
“prépension de retraite” and the “5 percent rule” are no longer applicable. 
As a consequence, early retirement possibilities for women are signiﬁ  cantly 
worsened, as before 1987 they could retire at a minimum age of ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve, 
which is now no longer possible.
The last reform aﬀecting workers in our analysis dates back to 1997. Fol-
lowing up on a ruling by the European court of Justice requiring Belgium 
to put an end to the discrimination against men in the wage-  earner pension 
system, the government decides to align the treatment of men and women by 
raising the female full career condition and the associated normal retirement 
age to the one applicable to men. Since 1997, the compulsory age of retire-
ment for women has gradually been raised to sixty- one in 1997, sixty- two in 
2000, sixty- three in 2003, sixty- four in 2006, and will attain sixty- ﬁ  ve in 2009, 
with the corresponding increase in the full- career requirement from forty to 
forty- ﬁ   ve years. While aimed at eliminating discrimination, the measure has 
also a clearly beneﬁ  cial impact in budgetary terms and contributes positively 
to the longer term viability of the regime.
Finally, the most recent reform to retirement incentives is introduced into 
the system in early 2007. As a result of the Intergenerational Solidarity 
Pact3 negotiated between the social partners and the government in late 
2005, workers working beyond the age of sixty-  two or beyond forty-  four 
years of career can beneﬁ  t from a pension supplement. The pension bonus 
of an amount of two euros per day worked beyond these limits augments 
the annual beneﬁ  t payable, and this independently of the wage earned or 
the contributions accumulated. As such, it can be seen as a much stronger 
relative incentive for lower-  wage earners than for higher-  wage earners.
Conventional Early Retirement
Next to the wage-  earner pension system, a parallel system of supple-
mentary beneﬁ  ts for early retirement is created in 1973 for the old workers 
in case of ﬁ  ring: the conventional early retirement (“la Prépension conven-
tionelle”). The announced goal of the scheme—which is not run by the 
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jobs between young and old. The program intends to achieve this goal by 
insuring a decent income to old workers that are forced to retire earlier than 
the normal pension age.
At the beginning, workers of age sixty and above who lose their job are 
eligible for the beneﬁ  ts of the system. One condition to be eligible for the 
regime is that the worker has been laid oﬀ by his employer, and a further 
condition stipulates that the employer has to recruit a person beneﬁ  ting from 
full-  time unemployment beneﬁ  ts as a replacement for the worker. The laid 
oﬀ elderly worker is then, in his turn, entitled to unemployment beneﬁ  ts with 
a top- up complementary beneﬁ  t paid by the employer. This complementary 
beneﬁ  t is equal to half the diﬀerence between the net wage and the unem-
ployment beneﬁ  t. A particularity of the system is that these early retirees are 
exempted from job search and—as for all unemployed—the time spent in 
the early retirement program is fully credited in the earnings ﬁ  le for pension 
purposes. As the crediting in the earnings history is done at a constant real 
value, it means that the worker’s only ﬁ  nancial loss is the immediate loss 
of purchasing power due to the lower level of the combined beneﬁ  ts with 
respect to the net wage previously earned.
If initially the age of early retirement is set at sixty, the limit is rapidly 
lowered by means of collective bargaining agreements within industries. As 
a result, there ultimately exists a variety of diﬀerent regimes with diﬀerent 
career requirements, minimum ages, replacement of the worker, and so 
forth, for diﬀerent sectors and companies. In front of this imbroglio, the 
legislation is harmonized in 1986 by setting the minimum age at ﬁ  fty-  eight 
years. However, numerous exceptions persist with respect to the general 
rules. For example, while workers below the age of sixty do in theory have to 
be replaced when they are put onto early retirement, this is not the case for 
companies that are considered in economic diﬃculty or in restructuring, or 
if the company is closing or unable to ﬁ  nd a suitable replacement. Similarly, 
while the age of ﬁ  fty-  eight is a priori the minimum access age, a lower age is 
possible in some sectors (steel, glass, textile, etc.) at the ages of ﬁ  fty- ﬁ  ve, ﬁ  fty-
  six, or ﬁ  fty-  seven, depending on more stringent career conditions. Similar 
exceptions exist for some workers in the construction sector and some who 
work in shifts. Even more pronounced reductions in the minimum age are 
possible when the company is recognized as being in economic diﬃculty, 
under which case the age can be brought down to ﬁ  fty-  two years, or even 
ﬁ  fty in special circumstances.
As a consequence of the Intergenerational Solidarity Pact of 2005, the 
conditions for access to the conventional early retirement scheme are becom-
ing more stringent for all cases of early retirement before the age of sixty 
but not directly linked to companies in economic diﬃculties. As of January 
2008, the access to the conventional early retirement route at age ﬁ  fty- eight is 
restricted to people with long working careers in a limitative list of “exhaust-52        Alain Jousten, Mathieu Lefèbvre, Sergio Perelman, and Pierre Pestieau
ing” occupations. The access to routes opening up at ages ﬁ  fty- ﬁ  ve, ﬁ  fty- six, 
and ﬁ  fty-  seven will also progressively be tightened and the reference ages 
increased over the next ﬁ  ve years.
Legal Early Retirement
Between 1976 and 1982, another program of early retirement coexists 
with those exposed previously. The so-  called system of legal early retire-
ment (“Prépension légale”) holds that the workers have access to the same 
status as the one provided by the conventional early retirement system, with 
the major diﬀerence being that the worker did not need to be laid oﬀ by his 
employer but could freely opt into the system. As a consequence of this 
diﬀerent setting, the cost of the complementary beneﬁ  t is not supported by 
the employer but by the social security budget with the restriction that the 
employer has to hire a young unemployed aged less than thirty and beneﬁ  t-
ing from full-  time unemployment compensation. Access to this scheme is 
possible under an age condition of sixty for men and ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve for women.
Part-  Time Early Retirement and the System of Career Breaks
In 1993 the possibility of work and half- time early retirement is introduced 
into the Belgian landscape. Access to the status is conditional on a written 
agreement between the worker and his employer. Further conditions relate 
to the age of the worker (no lower than ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve) as well as the replacement 
of the worker by a fully indemniﬁ  ed unemployed for the reduced portion of 
his schedule. This path is complex and is chosen by very few people—less 
than 1,000 people are registered in 2005.
Another route to early retirement is opened by the career break scheme, 
which is originally introduced in 1985 but later modiﬁ  ed in 2001 to make it 
more ﬂ  exible for early retirement. It allows workers to reduce their working 
hours or take a career break for any reason, while maintaining their social 
insurance protection and even usually getting a career break beneﬁ  t. The 
scheme speciﬁ  cally attempts to allow workers age ﬁ  fty and above to reduce 
their working hours and thus permit a progressive shift into retirement. It 
allows both a reduction to a four-  ﬁ  fth schedule and a reduction to a half-
 time  schedule.
Aged Unemployed Exempted from Job Search
The last exit path out of the labor market is known as the regime for the 
“Old aged unemployed,” a status that is introduced in 1985 into the Belgian 
social insurance landscape. According to this regime, an unemployed per-
son aged at least ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve and who is out of his job for at least two years is 
exempted of job search and continues to receive the unemployment bene-
ﬁ  ts without any restrictions in time or in availability for the job market. In 
1996, the age of admission to the system is lowered to the age of ﬁ  fty and 
the period of joblessness is lowered to one year. As a result, this scheme is The Eﬀects of Early Retirement on Youth Unemployment    5 3
4. This alludes to an old European commercial for Canada Dry ginger ale that was said to 
have the color of beer without being it.
widely used in the Belgian retirement landscape. In its most extreme ver-
sion, employers use it to separate from older workers by compensating them 
with (large) lump sum compensations/side payments—this way avoiding 
the more complicated and stringent conventional early retirement route. 
The latter mechanism is also known in the Belgian context by the name of 
“Canada Dry” retirement arrangements, as it looks and tastes like early 
retirement but it formally is none.4
Faced with the growing importance of these arrangements, the govern-
ment progressively introduces changes to the legislation to slow down the 
spread of its use and abuse. Since July 2004, new entrants to the system 
have to satisfy more stringent conditions to access the waiver with respect 
to the availability for job search. Under the new rules, only workers age ﬁ  fty-
  eight and above or with very long careers can still beneﬁ  t from the full job 
search waiver, while those below ﬁ  fty-  eight still have to be available for the 
labor market. However, while the younger jobless are increasingly subject 
to stricter controls of their availability for the job market, these same rules 
are not enforced on those age ﬁ  fty and above—hence, making the changes 
less dramatic than they may seem at ﬁ  rst sight.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 present early exit routes over the period 1980 to 2005. 
They show for each year, at January 31, the percentage of men and women 
recorded as beneﬁ  ciaries of each program. On both ﬁ  gures, we see how 
the structure changed over time with the introduction of new exit paths to 
retirement, namely the aged unemployed scheme in 1985 and its extension 
in 1996.
1.2.2    Speciﬁ   c  Unemployment  Policies  Targeted  Toward  the  Young
A speciﬁ  city of the Belgian social insurance system is the generalized 
availability of unemployment beneﬁ  ts (called “waiting allowance”) for 
young people on the pure basis of education. As of 1945 unemployment 
beneﬁ  ts are given on the basis of studies. Initially it is only implemented for 
people that have followed vocational schooling. Formally, there is no age 
limit but the individual has to claim beneﬁ  ts in the ﬁ  rst year following the 
end of his studies. In 1951, the status is extended to people having completed 
apprenticeships. The waiting period before claiming the ﬁ  rst beneﬁ  t is set at 
seventy- ﬁ   ve  days.  In  1968,  the  list  of  admissible  graduates  is  extended  to  all 
secondary education levels (technical or general) and the age limit was gener-
ally set at twenty- ﬁ  ve years of age. In 1980, the maximum age is pushed up to 
twenty-  six, the waiting period increased from seventy-  ﬁ  ve days to 150 days, 
and in 1983 the one-  year deadline on ﬁ  rst claiming is eliminated. In 1985, 
the possibility of ﬁ  rst claiming these beneﬁ  ts is introduced for people aged 
between twenty-  six and thirty subject to a waiting period of 300 days. The Fig. 1.1    Exit paths to early retirement—Men
Source: Belgostat and National Oﬃce of Pension (ONP-  RVP).
Fig. 1.2    Exit paths to early retirement—Women
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5. This view is also called the lump- of- output fallacy since it assumes that output is unaﬀected 
by the job reallocation. While it seems that labor force exiting will aﬀect the wage rate and inﬂ  a-
tion and then output (Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 1991).
year 1994 is the last major reform of the system with waiting periods further 
increased for people belonging to diﬀerent age brackets below the age of 
thirty. The new standards are 155 days for those aged less than eighteen, 233 
days between eighteen and twenty- ﬁ  ve, and 310 days between twenty- six and 
thirty, corresponding to six, nine, and twelve months, respectively.
Currently, almost every young person leaving school in Belgium is entitled 
to unemployment beneﬁ  ts without any work requirement. It is common 
for young people aged less than thirty to sign up with the regional Public 
Employment Service as a job seeker immediately upon receiving one’s 
school diploma (usually high school or college/university). This enrollment 
entitles the graduate to an unemployment beneﬁ  t awarded after the above-
mentioned age-  dependent waiting period. This unemployment beneﬁ  t—
which is awarded for an indeﬁ  nite period of time—was at ﬁ  rst based on the 
level of education attained by the graduate. Over time, it has progressively 
evolved into a lump sum amount, which is purely a factor of the family status 
of the person claiming the beneﬁ  t. Administratively, the young unemployed 
receiving the “waiting allowance” is considered a job seeker and techni-
cally enters the category of persons beneﬁ  ting from full- time unemployment 
beneﬁ  ts.
A number of jobs beneﬁ  ting from tax and contributions exemptions are 
open to the young unemployed at the end of the waiting period. Conse-
quently, when the waiting period increases one observes a similar increase 
in the rate of youth unemployment (ONEM 2001).
1.3      Lump of Labor Fallacy and Youth Unemployment in Belgium
The idea that forcing elderly workers out of the labor market before the 
statutory age of retirement would provide jobs for the unemployed young 
has been for a long time widely accepted in several European countries, 
particularly in Belgium, where youth unemployment is particularly high 
both in absolute and in relative terms. For most economists and (fortu-
nately) an increasing number of Belgians, this view is based on the errone-
ous belief in a ﬁ  xed amount of work, what is sometimes dubbed a “boxed 
economy.” Economists call this allegedly widespread view the “lump of 
labor fallacy.”
Those who make the fallacy claim fail to oﬀer speciﬁ  c evidence of the sup-
posed belief in a ﬁ  xed amount of work. Yet it is too convenient to yield the 
burden of the proof on the advocates of the lump of labor fallacy.5 In this 
study we revisit the question of whether pre- retirement is a means to free up 
jobs for the young. Boldrin et al. (1999) have started to do so by comparing 56        Alain Jousten, Mathieu Lefèbvre, Sergio Perelman, and Pierre Pestieau
for several countries and several periods the relation between pre- retirement 
and youth unemployment. Their conclusion is negative but their methodol-
ogy is questionable. They plot the exit rates from the labor force of older 
workers and the variation in the unemployment rate of young workers and 
do not ﬁ  nd any negative link between the two variables.
What we want to do in this section is to look at the main characteristics 
of youth unemployment in Belgium over the last decades and to see whether 
such unemployment would decrease with an increase in the demand of 
labor. Implicitly, we assume that pre-  retirement policies imply an increased 
demand for labor and that such a demand is relevant for the unemployed 
young. In other words, for the sake of the argument, we follow the reasoning 
of the advocates of the lump of labor.
Belgian youth unemployment is high and has tended to increase in recent 
years from 15 percent in 2000 to 20 percent in 2005. The youth unemploy-
ment rate is about three times higher than the adult unemployment.
Figure 1.3 shows the diﬀerences across a number of Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries over the years 
1984, 1995, 2000, and 2005 for the rate of unemployment of the young age 
ﬁ  fteen to twenty-  four. One sees that Belgium is in the same league as France, 
Italy, Spain, and Sweden—countries with very high youth unemployment.
A key feature of Belgian youth unemployment is that it concerns unskilled 
Fig.  1.3  Youth  ﬁ   fteen  to  twenty-  four  unemployment  rates  in  OECD  countries
Source: OECD labor force database (2006a).The Eﬀects of Early Retirement on Youth Unemployment    5 7
workers. Figure 1.4 gives the evolution of unemployment for three levels of 
education. One clearly sees that the rate of unemployment of unskilled has 
been increasing over the period 1992 to 2004 for both genders and is above 
the double of the rate of unemployment of young with medium or high 
levels of education.
Consider four standard explanations for youth unemployment in Bel-
gium:
￿    Lack of professional training
￿   Mismatching
￿    Unemployment compensation combined with family arrangements
￿    Minimum wages and employment regulation
1.  In Belgium, the transition from school to work is very abrupt. Full-
  time education is the norm, with dual apprenticeship schemes remaining 
marginal. Internship is not an integral part of a student’s school or univer-
sity career.
2. Mismatching is another important cause of unemployment. Mis-
matching can be due to the educational system that is not suﬃciently aimed 
at the needs of the industrial world but also to the lack of geographical 
mobility.
3.  As we have seen, the young are entitled to unemployment compensa-
tions even without working experience. For unskilled young, these com-
pensations are not high. However, combined with the possibility of staying 
within the family, these compensations generate a rather high reservation 
wage.
4.  Belgium has a minimum wage, which is often viewed as a cause of unem-
ployment, particularly among young workers. There is not much diﬀerence 
between the wages earned by young people and by adults. These relatively 
high wages paid to young workers can act as a barrier to the recruitment of 
unskilled young. Another barrier is the relatively strict set of employment 
regulation protecting insiders, coupled with the rules restricting the tempo-
rary contracts that many young workers have.
Assume that forcing elderly workers out of the labor force through all 
sorts of routes such as early retirement, disability, and unemployment gen-
erates employment opportunities for the young. This assumption assumes 
that the labor market is a zero-  sum game, which clearly is rejected by most 
economists. Making this assumption, we want to show that even under this 
implausible case, it is not even sure that exiting elderly workers from the 
labor market does imply employment for the unemployed.
With mismatching, insuﬃcient training, and high reservation wages as 
explanatory factors of unemployment, it is unlikely that increasing the quan-
tity of jobs will generate more employment of the young. In other words, to Fig. 1.4    Youth unemployment rates by education level and gender
Source: European Labor Force Surveys (1983–  2004).The Eﬀects of Early Retirement on Youth Unemployment    5 9
6. High Employment Council (2007) showed that a large part of the unemployment in Brus-
sels and Flanders are of foreign origin.
7. Furthermore, Belgium has a high rate of school attendance even between ages eighteen and 
twenty. In 1997, 90 percent of the young age eighteen to twenty were still at school.
8. This means, for example, that people qualiﬁ  ed as early retirees or aged unemployed accord-
ing to the Belgian administrative classiﬁ  cation would be classiﬁ  ed as being out of the labor 
force under ILO standards.
foster youth employment, the solution is not early retirement but a better 
integration of the entering workforce as well as a reform of the educational 
system, of the unemployment insurance, and of the minimum wage.6 More 
importantly, a drastic change in values is crucial. But, as Kipling would say, 
“that is another story.”
1.4    The  Data
1.4.1    Labor  Force  Data
We subdivide the population into three subgroups: the older workers 
(ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four years of age), the prime aged workers (twenty-  ﬁ  ve to 
ﬁ  fty-  four) and the young (twenty to twenty-  four). The precise cutoﬀ points 
between these diﬀerent groups are clearly of a key importance and mostly 
dictated by the institutional setting. Since in Belgium education is compul-
sory until the age of eighteen and data is generally available in ﬁ  ve-  year age 
brackets, we do not consider any ﬁ  ve-  year age bracket, including people 
subject to compulsory schooling. Therefore, the lowest age considered is 
the age of twenty.7
Our analysis draws heavily on the European Labor Force Survey (LFS) for 
the time period 1983 to 2004. The data are used to derive labor force mea-
sures such as employment rate (ER), unemployment rate (UR), and labor 
force participation rate (LFP). Similarly, other demographic indicators are 
also computed for the individuals studied using the LFS data. For deriving 
the labor force indicators, we relied on the internationally recognized deﬁ  -
nitions as proposed by the International Labor Organization (ILO) rather 
than relying on administrative classiﬁ  cations.8
Other data are derived from OECD databases. In particular, the gross 
domestic product (GDP) indicators come from the OECD national accounts 
database (2006b),
Figures 1.5 and 1.6 present some illustrative data to set the stage. They 
illustrate the weak link between the unemployment (UR) of the two younger 
age groups in Belgium as compared to the labor force participation rate 
of the older workers (LFP). There does not seem to be a uniform relation 
between the labor force participation of the elderly and the employment 
possibilities of the young. While during the earlier period, reduced labor Fig. 1.5    Trends in unemployment and labor force participation of the young com-
pared to the labor force participation of the old
Source: European Labor Force Surveys (1983–  2004).
Fig. 1.6    Trends in unemployment of the young and prime aged workers compared 
to the labor force participation of the old
Source: European Labor Force Surveys (1983–  2004).The Eﬀects of Early Retirement on Youth Unemployment    6 1
force participation of the elderly seemed to move in parallel with lower 
unemployment for the young, this relation does not hold anymore since the 
middle of the 1990s. These results are hard to match with any speciﬁ  c policy 
change described in section 1.2. While the most important policy change was 
undoubtedly the reform of the 5 percent rule in 1991, no major eﬀect seems 
to be observable in the labor market outcomes. On the contrary, this reform 
has been followed by a large increase in youth unemployment rate.
Finally, it is interesting to compare the labor force participation of the old 
to that of the young and the prime age as in ﬁ  gure 1.7. The graph reveals that 
the young are the only age group with a constantly falling labor force partici-
pation rate over the entire time period. Prime age workers have experienced 
a sustained growth in activity over the entire time period, whereas the same 
is also true for the older group since the middle of the 1990s.
1.4.2      The Inducement to Retire
Beyond these labor force data, we use another set of data on early retire-
ment, namely indicators of incentive measures. The reason for constructing 
separate incentive measures instead of using the survey data is that we want 
to use a measure of the inducement to retire to explain labor force behavior. 
To avoid endogeneity problems in our ensuing empirical analysis, we need 
to develop a simulation approach by which we compute hypothetical beneﬁ  t 
Fig. 1.7    Trends in labor force participation for the three age groups
Source: European Labor Force Surveys (1983–  2004).62        Alain Jousten, Mathieu Lefèbvre, Sergio Perelman, and Pierre Pestieau
9. All these incentives are expressed in 2002 euros.
10. We use the empirically observed age- and cohort-  speciﬁ  c cumulative hazard until the 
normal retirement as a proxy for the probabilities of departure through the early retirement 
and unemployment pathways.
11. Technically, an individual can continue to work but largely loses his protection against 
layoﬀs. Furthermore, the continuation of work is only possible with the explicit written agree-
ment on the part of the employer.
levels for a typical worker for all possible year and age cells covered by the 
labor force data that we described in the previous subsection.
To compute such aggregate incentive measures we perform beneﬁ  t simula-
tions akin to those presented by Jousten et al. (2005) for all cohorts under 
study. We then use the various beneﬁ  t amounts derived for a hypothetical 
representative individual corresponding to the median of the income distri-
bution. We compute these beneﬁ  ts proﬁ  les for the three main exit paths that 
this median individual may encounter: unemployment insurance, conven-
tional early retirement, and normal retirement. Each of these paths yields 
diﬀerent beneﬁ  ts. We then compute for each possible age and year as well as 
for each sex the present discounted value of these beneﬁ  ts using a 3 percent 
discount rate. We will continue to call the thus derived present discounted 
values Social Security Wealth (W) in accordance with the previous literature 
on individual retirement incentives.9
Once these W ﬁ  gures are obtained year by year for each individual exit 
path and possible retirement age, we aggregate those three incentives into 
one aggregate W incentive measure that represents the global incentive to 
retire according to year and to age. Expressed in symbols, this is equivalent 
to deriving
W   W pen   punem   max[0, W unem   W pen]   pear   max [0, W ear   W pens],
where punem and pear represents the cohort and year-  speciﬁ  c probabilities of 
exiting by the speciﬁ  ed routes of unemployment or early retirement.10 For 
pure reasons of simplicity, we assume that over the age span ranging from 
ﬁ  fty to sixty-  ﬁ  ve the whole cohort leaves the labor market and goes into 
retirement—a rather reasonable assumption in the Belgian context given 
the quasi-  compulsory nature of retirement at the latest when reaching the 
full retirement age.11 The exit probabilities are calculated using the LFS for 
the period of 1983 to 2004, and the results are rescaled to obtain a total 
departure by the age of sixty-  ﬁ  ve. Finally we average over sex to obtain one 
W by cohort.
Figure 1.8 illustrates the trends in the incentive measure as experienced by 
successive cohorts of hypothetical Belgian median wage earners. It displays 
a secular upward trend in beneﬁ  t levels for the successive cohorts, combined 
with a hump-  shaped proﬁ  le of beneﬁ  t for each individual cohort. The only 
major beneﬁ  t change over the period under study was the change in the The Eﬀects of Early Retirement on Youth Unemployment    6 3
actuarial adjustment rule in 1991. Unsurprisingly, it has the biggest impact 
on cohorts close to the early retirement age of sixty—which translates into 
an upward bump in the incentive variable for older cohorts in 1991. Other 
factors, such as the generalization of the exemption from job search in the 
middle of the 1990s, have a very limited eﬀect, thus leading one to conjec-
ture that even in the absence of a formal ruling unemployment beneﬁ  ciaries 
were anyway already de facto exempted from job search. The impact of the 
expansion of the conventional early retirement provisions to the age of ﬁ  fty-
 eight in 1986 was modest for retirement incentives, hence indicating that the 
prevalence of other routes must have been such that the importance of this 
legislative change was rather limited. Further aggregating up these year- 
and age-  speciﬁ  c W, it is possible to compute a yearly index that takes into 
account the various incentives by age. We proceed to estimate two incentive 
indexes that are weighted sums of incentive indicators. The ﬁ  rst one, denoted 
W  , is purely based on the age- and- year speciﬁ  c W thus derived. The second 
indicator—that we will call the “inducement to retire,” denoted I  —is a mix 
of the concept of W and that of Peak Value (PV):
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Fig. 1.8    SSW for selected cohorts by year
Source: Results from our own simulation.64        Alain Jousten, Mathieu Lefèbvre, Sergio Perelman, and Pierre Pestieau
12. Setting the ﬁ  nancial discount rate to inﬁ  nity is equivalent to assuming the individual is 
perfectly liquidity constrained.
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with
(1)  I(a, y)   W(a, y)    [W(a, y) PV(a, y)].
In the above expressions, W represents the Social Security Wealth, and PV, 
the Peak Value. The PV at age a is deﬁ  ned as the maximum W the individual 
can obtain by optimally choosing the time of retirement between the current 
moment y and the statutory retirement age. Variable LFP is the labor force 
participation and P is the proportion of retired persons of that age in that 
year, and both variables are derived using the LFS.
In equation (1) the concept I summarizes two broad pieces of informa-
tion. The ﬁ  rst element on the right-  hand side expresses the idea that the 
larger W, the larger the wealth a person has at his avail, and thus the easier 
it is for him to retire early. The second term expresses the idea that by wait-
ing till the optimal time—as summarized by the gain in present discounted 
value between immediate retirement and the optimal retirement maximizing 
the present discounted value—the individual faces an incentive to stay at 
work. Finally,   is a coeﬃcient that reﬂ  ects the notion of discounting future 
revenue gains with respect to present wealth—beyond the pure eﬀect of 
ﬁ  nancial discounting as captured by the 3 percent discount rate.12 The idea 
behind this parameterization is to capture the individual’s possible impa-
tience, making them less willing or incapable (    0) to consider future 
revenue or wealth gains before they become available.
We endogenously estimate the parameter value for   using two diﬀerent 
procedures. The results of these estimations are displayed in table 1.1. The 
equation we estimate is given by
(2) LFPold,t    W   t   ϕ(W  t           P  V   t  )    Xt   εt.
The ﬁ  rst two terms on the right- hand side of equation (2) correspond to the 
components of the incentive indicator I, and X is a vector of control vari-
ables. The implied value of   thus corresponds to the ratio of ϕ over  .
Then, we validate the previous results using an iteration process on ϕ and 
  that attempts to maximize R2 as an objective function—a process one 
could qualify as a simpliﬁ  ed maximum likelihood approach.
In table 1.1, the value of   given by both iteration and regression pro-The Eﬀects of Early Retirement on Youth Unemployment    6 5
cedures is negative, which is inconsistent with the methodology proposed. 
The reason for such a result can be found in the methodology itself. The 
computation of this indicator of the inducement to retire likely results in 
an overly aggregated and averaged indicator, especially in the context of the 
multitude of early retirement pathways as present in Belgium. In the next 
section, we will only use W   as an incentive since the negative value of   leads 
us to assume that it is nil in the econometric estimations. If     0, I   is equal 
to W  . We will come back to the estimation of I   in section 1.6 where we study 
women and men separately.
1.5    Regression  Analysis
Moving beyond the purely descriptive analysis of the previous section, we 
now turn to ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. It proceeds in 
two steps. The ﬁ  rst step is an econometric study of the direct relationship 
between the employment of the old and the employment of the young. The 
second step is an analysis of how the incentives faced by the old directly 
inﬂ  uence the employment outcomes of the young.
For the ﬁ  rst type of analysis, we estimate both regressions in levels and 
in diﬀerences. We settle on four speciﬁ  cations: in levels, with a three-  year 
lag and also with ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀerence and ﬁ  ve-  year log diﬀerence. The levels 
regression links the labor force performance measures of the young and 
middle-  aged to those of the old:
Table 1.1  Estimating the parameters of I
        ϕ       R2   Implied I   weighting
1. Iterating over   and ϕ 
with 0.25 intervals 
and regressing LFP 
of old on I   and 
covariates
0.5 –1.25 –2.5 0.924 0.5   W   – 1.25   W      –     P  V  
2. Iterating over ϕ with 
    1 with 0.25 
intervals and 
regressing LFP of old 
on I   and covariates
1 –2.25 –2.25 0.924 1   W   – 2.25   W     –     P  V  
3. Time series regression 
of LFP of old on W   
and    W     –     P  V  
0.748∗ –1.745∗∗∗ –2.4 0.924 0.748   W   – 1.745   W     –     P  V  
Notes: Reported is the coeﬃcient on the inducement to retire in thousands. Covariates include GDP per 
capita, the growth in GDP per capita, and the share of GDP coming from manufacturing sector,   cor-
responds to the ratio of ϕ over  .
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.66        Alain Jousten, Mathieu Lefèbvre, Sergio Perelman, and Pierre Pestieau
13. It might be useful to remember that unemployment rate is not one minus employment 
rate. If we denote P total population, L active population, and U unemployed population, the 
unemployment rate is U/L and the employment rate is (L –   U)/P.
 A t        Bt    Xt   εt
 A t        Bt 3    Xt   εt
where At is the UR or the ER for either youth or prime age population. Simi-
larly, by extension, we consider a regression of the percent of young still in an 
educational program (SCH). Variable Bt is either the labor force participa-
tion rate of the old workers, and Xt is a set of covariates that includes GDP 
per capita, the growth in GDP per capita, and the share of GDP coming 
from manufacturing sector.
The diﬀerence speciﬁ  cation takes the following form:
 A t 5   At        [Bt 5   Bt]    [Xt 5   Xt]   εt 5   εt
ln At 5   ln At        [ln Bt 5   ln Bt]    [ln Xt 5   ln Xt]   εt 5   εt.
Results are reported in table 1.2. We run the regressions with and without 
control variables. As exposed previously, table 1.2 presents four alternative 
speciﬁ  cations in order to identify clearly the likely eﬀects of elderly labor 
force participation on younger labor outcomes. The table also shows the 
estimated eﬀect of the activity of elderly on the proportion of youth in 
school. One immediate observation is that elderly participation seems to 
play a more important role when controlling for other eﬀects. Thus, we will 
pay more attention to these results.
Whatever one of the ﬁ  rst three speciﬁ  cations, when they are signiﬁ  cant, 
the coeﬃcients are of the same sign and magnitude. Concerning the youth 
regressions, the results are contradictory. The labor force participation of 
the old appears to have a positive impact on youth unemployment rate and 
also a positive impact on the youth employment rate.13 On the contrary, it 
has, when signiﬁ  cant, a negative eﬀect on the rate of schooling. As explained 
before, the rate of employment is much more relevant to account for activity 
in youth than one minus the rate of unemployment. We may thus conclude 
that the elderly participation has a positive eﬀect on youth employment and 
schooling.
The ﬁ  ve- year log diﬀerence speciﬁ  cation contrasts with these results. The 
eﬀect on youth unemployment disappears but we still have the same kind 
of eﬀects on the employment and schooling. The regressions between older 
and prime age workers seem to display a slight substitution between those 
workers. Yet for the ﬁ  ve- year log diﬀerence speciﬁ  cation, we do not ﬁ  nd any 
eﬀect on youth employment but a negative eﬀect on unemployment.
We now turn to the second exercise that tries to relate the incentives faced The Eﬀects of Early Retirement on Youth Unemployment    6 7
by the elderly to the labor market outcomes of the younger cohorts. As dis-
cussed in section 1.4, this approach has the advantage of being less prone to 
endogeneity problems than the approach just presented.
Table 1.3 presents only the results for W   (and not for I  ) since the esti-
mations of section 1.4 lead us to consider a value of   equal to zero. The 
variable W   explains very well the fall in labor force participation of older 
persons, which is a prerequisite for using it as an instrumental variable in the 
following estimations. The regression coeﬃcients when considering younger 
cohorts outcomes are hardly signiﬁ  cant in levels but we observe higher sig-
niﬁ  cance with the ﬁ  ve-  years’ diﬀerence speciﬁ  cation. The estimates conﬁ  rm 
results obtained with labor outcomes regressions. It is diﬃcult to observe 
any clear result concerning the younger people, especially if we have some 
doubt about youth unemployment rate as a suitable indicator. The eﬀect, if 
any, on the prime age workers indicates some substitution between elderly 
and prime age workers.
Table 1.2  Direct eﬀect of elderly labor outcomes on the young (women and men 
combined)
Youth 20 to 24 Prime age 25 to 54
Speciﬁ  cation   UR   ER   SCH   UR   ER
No controls
Levels 0.539∗∗ 0.067 0.081 0.056 0.094
(0.217) (0.219) (0.278) (0.124) (0.262)
3- year  lag 0.328 0.589∗∗ –0.627∗ 0.337∗∗ –0.589∗∗
(0.278) (0.235) (0.297) (0.116) (0.248)
5- year  diﬀerence 0.591 0.292 –0.092 0.116 –0.089
(0.357) (0.208) (0.171) (0.136) (0.089)
5- year  log 
diﬀerence
0.883 0.152 –0.075 0.296 –0.039
(0.549) (0.111) (0.132) (0.448) (0.032)
With controls
Levels 0.619∗∗∗ 0.185 –0.118 0.151∗∗ –0.116∗∗
(0.180) (0.157) (0.129) (0.068) (0.054)
3- year  lag 0.534∗∗ 0.372∗ –0.259 0.273∗∗∗ –0.262∗∗∗
(0.221) (0.211) (0.173) (0.076) (0.048)
5- year  diﬀerence 0.683∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗ –0.099 0.198∗∗∗ –0.166∗∗
(0.139) (0.125) (0.153) (0.038) (0.056)
5- year  log 
diﬀerence   
0.093 0.408∗∗∗ –0.330∗ 0.092 0.408∗∗∗
(0.294)   (0.108)   (0.169)   (0.294)   (0.107)
Notes: Reported is the coeﬃcient on elderly participation rate. Covariates include GDP per 
capita, the growth in GDP per capita, and the share of GDP coming from manufacturing 
sector.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.68        Alain Jousten, Mathieu Lefèbvre, Sergio Perelman, and Pierre Pestieau
1.6    Alternative  Speciﬁ   cation:  Women  and  Men  Separated
Until now we have considered the aggregate labor market performance. 
Realities change when we diﬀerentiate according to sex. Indeed, the labor 
outcomes of men and women have been largely diﬀerent in the past decades. 
The growing participation of women, for example, has clearly changed the 
situation of the labor market. Figures 1.9, 1.10, and 1.11 present these 
diﬀerent patterns. On ﬁ  gure 1.9, we observe that if both activity of young 
men and women has slightly decreased during the period, the unemployment 
rates of the two groups have evolved in a diﬀerent direction. The young men 
unemployment rate has increased while the young women unemployment 
rate has decreased. On ﬁ  gure 1.10, the unemployment rate of prime- age men 
and women is displayed. Here we also see that the women unemployment 
rate has decreased during the period considered, which is not the case for 
men. Finally, ﬁ  gure 1.11 presents the labor force participation of the three 
age groups. Both older and prime age women’s activity has been increas-
ing.
While the earlier regressions only took into account the average behavior 
of labor outcomes in Belgium, we propose to run the same regressions when 
diﬀerentiating by sex the left- hand side. In other words, we still consider the 
eﬀect of labor force participation of all elderly workers but we account for 
diﬀerences between young men and women. The previous ﬁ  gures show that 
in Belgium, the labor market performances of men and women are diﬀerent. 
The idea is to explore whether the diverging labor outcomes of younger age 
Table 1.3  Direct eﬀect of the inducement to retire (women and men combined)
Using W   as an 
explanatory variable
In level In 5-  years diﬀerence
  Coeﬃcient  
Standard 
error   R2   Coeﬃcient  
Standard 
error   R2
LFP of old –0.820∗∗∗ 0.101 0.823 –0.806∗∗∗ 0.132 0.819
Unemployment of 
young –0.487∗∗ 0.226 0.493 –0.799∗∗∗ 0.078 0.978
Employment of 
young –0.148 0.183 0.547 –0.125 0.169 0.688
School of young –0.069 0.135 0.849 –0.237∗ 0.108 0.735
Unemployment of 
prime age –0.059 0.084 0.720 –0.179∗∗∗ 0.051 0.929
Employment of 
prime age 0.040 0.061 0.963 0.081 0.066 0.698
Notes: Reported is the coeﬃcient on the inducement to retire in thousands. Covariates include GDP per 
capita, the growth in GDP per capita, and the share of GDP coming from manufacturing sector.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.Fig. 1.9    Trends in unemployment and labor force participation of the young com-
pared to the labor force participation of the old by sex
Source: European Labor Force Surveys (1983–  2004).Fig. 1.10    Trends in unemployment of the young and prime aged workers compared 
to the labor force participation of the old by sex
Source: European Labor Force Surveys (1983–  2004).Fig. 1.11    Trends in labor force participation for the three age groups by sex
Source: European Labor Force Surveys (1983–  2004).72        Alain Jousten, Mathieu Lefèbvre, Sergio Perelman, and Pierre Pestieau
groups have been diﬀerently inﬂ  uenced by the global labor force participa-
tion of older workers.
As presented in table 1.4, these new regressions do not give diﬀerent results 
from those of table 1.2. Whatever the speciﬁ  cation, the coeﬃcients are of the 
same magnitude and display similar signiﬁ  cance except for the level regres-
sion with controls. This is important since it shows that the results presented 
in table 1.2 are robust to taking into account diﬀerences between sexes. 
However, these estimates are still confusing for the youth. Table 1.4 displays 
also the eﬀect of participation of older workers on a diﬀerent indicator of 
youth outcome. We have seen in section 1.2 that the youth unemployment is 
very dependent on the institutional framework and for this reason it may not 
be a good indicator of the youth labor market performance. When dividing 
the youth population according to status, diﬀerentiating the unemployed, 
employed, and at school young people is not suﬃcient. There is still a pro-
portion of individuals that do not belong to any of these categories. Think 
of the young people who are no longer attending schools but are also not 
looking for a job because of bad prospects of employment. The “extended” 
Table 1.4  Direct eﬀect of elderly labor outcomes on the young (women and men separated)
Youth 20–24 Prime age 25–54
Speciﬁ  cation  UR   ER   SCH   “Ext.”UR   UR   ER
No controls
Levels 0.536∗∗ 0.068 0.089 –0.157 0.053 0.104
(0.252) (0.272) (0.205) (0.214) (0.181) (0.858)
3- year  lag 0.336 0.585∗ –0.627∗∗∗ 0.042 0.341∗ –0.597
(0.301) (0.327) (0.227) (0.267) (0.197) (1.001)
5- year 
diﬀerence
0.589∗∗ 0.293 –0.090 –0.202 0.115 –0.083
(0.269) (0.185) (0.134) (0.125) (0.109) (0.166)
5- year  log 
diﬀerence
0.941∗∗ 0.154 –0.074 –0.305 0.331 –0.068
(0.416) (0.101) (0.103) (0.192) (0.348) (0.073)
With controls
Levels 0.619∗∗∗ 0.184 –0.117 –0.067 0.150 –0.111
(0.164) (0.131) (0.109) (0.102) (0.090) (0.247)
3- year  lag 0.538∗∗ 0.369∗∗ –0.258∗ –0.111 0.274∗∗ –0.261
(0.203) (0.177) (0.148) (0.137) (0.105) (0.278)
5- year 
diﬀerence
0.684∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗ –0.098 –0.252∗ 0.198∗∗∗ –0.159∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.159) (0.121) (0.131) (0.039) (0.057)
5- year  log 
diﬀerence  
0.020 0.430∗∗∗ –0.353∗∗ –0.622∗∗ –0.416∗∗ –0.052
(0.319)   (0.130)   (0.138)   (0.283)   (0.158)   (0.041)
Notes: Reporteds is the coeﬃcient on elderly participation rate. Covariates include GDP per capita, the 
growth in GDP per capita, and the share of GDP coming from manufacturing sector.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.The Eﬀects of Early Retirement on Youth Unemployment    7 3
unemployment indicator proposed in table 1.4 accounts for this group in 
addition to conventional unemployment. The coeﬃcients are hardly signiﬁ  -
cant, but they show that the activity of elderly has a negative eﬀect on this 
indicator. With this result, one observes that the eﬀect of the labor force 
participation of the old on the young seems to be running contrary to the 
boxed economy proposition.
As in section 1.5, we turn to models that links the incentives faced by the 
elderly to the labor market outcomes of the young. The new sample requires 
that we reestimate the parameter value for   as we did in section 1.4 for 
women and men together. In this case, we consider speciﬁ  c indicators of 
incentives for each sex since the inducement to retire has been diﬀerent for 
women and men but we estimate the value of   pooling men and women 
together. Table 1.5 shows that the iteration and the regression procedures 
give the same result. Overall,   is equal to 1.
We perform levels regression and ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀerence regression using 
W   and one construction of I  . We use     1.01. Results of regressions are 
presented on table 1.6 and are very similar when we consider either W   or 
I  . First, a larger inducement to retire leads to a negative eﬀect on elderly 
labor force participation, both for levels and diﬀerence regressions. Sec-
ond, levels regressions do not present any signiﬁ  cant eﬀect of the incentive 
to retire on either the unemployment or the employment of the young 
workers. The diﬀerence approach displays, on the contrary, a negative and 
signiﬁ  cant eﬀect on youth unemployment, which is in line with table 1.4 
results. However, this should be read with a lot of caution. There does not 
Table 1.5  Estimating the parameters of I (women and men separated)
        ϕ       R2   Implied I   weighting
1. Iterating over   and ϕ 
with 0.25 intervals and 
regressing LFP of old 
on I   and covariates
Any values when     ϕ 1 0.991 1   W     1   W     –     P  V  
2. Iterating over ϕ with 
    1 with 0.25 intervals 
and regressing LFP of 
old on I   and covariates
1 1 1 0.991 1   W     1   W W     –     P  V  
3. Time series regression 
of LFP of old on W   
and    W     –     P  V  
  –0.458∗∗∗  –0.464∗∗∗  1.01 0.991 1    W     1.01   W W     –     P  V  
Notes: Reported is the coeﬃcient on the inducements to retire in thousands. Covariates include GDP per 
capita, the growth in GDP per capita, and the share of GDP coming from manufacturing sector and a 
sex dummy;   corresponds to the ratio of ϕ over  .
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
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seem to be any eﬀect on the employment rate of the young, which is the 
key labor market outcome in our view. When we consider the “extended” 
unemployment indicator, the sign of the coeﬃcient is reversed but still 
signiﬁ  cant.
The results obtained for the prime age group, twenty-  ﬁ  ve- to ﬁ  fty-  four-
  years-  old, are contradictory across levels and ﬁ  ve-  years’ diﬀerences model 
speciﬁ  cations, both in table 1.4 and in table 1.5. Overall, we cannot draw any 
deﬁ  nitive conclusion with respect to the link between early retirement and 
activity rates among the prime age group.
1.7    Conclusions
Belgium is characterized by a relatively high rate of unemployment of 
the young and a low rate of activity of the elderly workers. The latter is the 
consequence of high incentives to exit the labor force and these incentives 
are generally justiﬁ  ed in the name of fostering youth employment.
In this chapter we have tested the validity of such a belief. At the outset, 
we were not expecting too much from these tests for two reasons. First, theo-
retically one knows that there is no foundation for the idea that there would 
be such a thing as a ﬁ  xed lump of labor, implying that less elderly workers 
means more young workers. Second, the nature of youth unemployment in 
Belgium is such that it is pretty insensitive to variations in labor demand, 
but rather is the result of structural weaknesses in the areas of education, 
unemployment insurance, and wage formation.
In order to proceed with this test, we have constructed average indicators 
of incentive toward early retirement and we have shown that these incentives 
explain well variations in activity rates among elderly workers. But when we 
relate either participation rate of the elderly or the incentive indicators to 
unemployment or employment of the young, the results are mixed and have 
to be taken with caution.
First it seems important to know which variable of youth labor market 
performance is relevant. We have seen that youth unemployment rate is 
largely inﬂ  uenced by the employment policies toward the young. In this 
respect it seems preferable to use the employment rate.
Second, we emphasize the sharp contrast between men and women. The 
results are, however, not diﬀerent if we consider the aggregate labor market 
or if we make the distinction between men and women. We have shown that 
labor outcomes by gender have been slightly diﬀerent over the period but 
they do not turn into diﬀerent results than those obtained with aggregate 
labor market outcomes.
With these warnings in mind, we do not observe any clear positive link 
between the fall of labor force participation of elderly and youth employ-
ment. The lump of labor conjecture must be rejected for Belgium at least in 
the private sector to which this chapter is restricted.76        Alain Jousten, Mathieu Lefèbvre, Sergio Perelman, and Pierre Pestieau
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